Taxation of Financial Products: Options for Fundamental Reform by Raskolnikov, Alex
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2011 
Taxation of Financial Products: Options for Fundamental Reform 
Alex Raskolnikov 
Columbia Law School, arasko@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alex Raskolnikov, Taxation of Financial Products: Options for Fundamental Reform, TAX NOTES, VOL. 133, P. 
1549, 2011; COLUMBIA LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 415 (2011). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1717 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
Taxation of Financial Products:
Options for Fundamental Reform
By Alex Raskolnikov
Statement Of Alex Raskolnikov
Charles Evans Gerber Professor Of Law
Columbia Law School
Before The Joint Hearing Of The
U.S. House Committee On Ways And Means
U.S. Senate Committee On Finance
December 6, 2011
Chairman Camp, Chairman Baucus, Ranking
Members Levin and Hatch, distinguished Members
of the Committees,
Thank you for inviting me to testify at this
historic joint hearing.
I would like to make four main points:
First, the JCT Report your Committees receive
today is an important first step in reforming taxa-
tion of financial products (or derivatives). But it
cannot be the last step. Our knowledge of revenue
losses from derivatives-based tax reduction strate-
gies is largely anecdotal, wholly unsystematic, and
woefully incomplete. More research can and should
be done and Congress can play a critical role in
facilitating it.
Second, in the absence of comprehensive reform,
it is impossible to tax financial derivatives in a
manner that meets any accepted benchmark of an
effective and efficient capital income tax. As long as
the patchwork of current rules remains in place,
symmetry, consistency, and balance will all remain
unattainable.
Third, the fundamental reform alternatives are
limited, reasonably well-understood, and even
partly reflected in the current law. They include
anticipatory taxation, retroactive taxation, and
accrual-based (or mark-to-market) taxation. Each of
these approaches involves tradeoffs, and the adop-
tion of each approach for all financial products
would amount to a significant change in the current
law.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind how any
significant reform unrelated to financial products
(such as corporate integration or a switch to terri-
torial taxation) is likely to affect the stakes in
reforming the taxation of derivatives. These effects
vary from substantial to insignificant to uncertain.
I elaborate on each of these points below.
A. Challenges of Taxing Financial Instruments
It is difficult to overstate how poorly our tax
system deals with financial products. The rules are
incredibly complex,1 under- and over-inclusive,2
1The proposed Treasury regulations for the taxation of
contingent swaps are perhaps the most egregious example. See
Prop. Treas. Reg. section 1.446-3(g)(6), 69 Fed. Reg. 8,886 (Feb.
26, 2004).
2Certain aspects of the wash sale rules of section 1091 are
examples of over-inclusiveness. For instance, these rules cover
transactions where a depreciated share of stock sold at a loss is
replaced by an option (including an out-of-the-money option)
on the same stock even though such option is very different
economically from the share itself and, therefore, the transaction
does not come close to leaving taxpayer in the same position
with respect to the stock as he was before selling it — an abuse
targeted by the wash sale rules. The anti-extinguishment regime
of section 1234A is under-inclusive, arguably not extending to
derivatives that, while capital assets themselves, reference assets
that are not capital assets.
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ineffective in some respects3 and outdated in oth-
ers.4 They give rise to wasteful tax planning, rev-
enue losses, and unappealing distributional
consequences. They may impede legitimate busi-
ness hedging transactions, and they certainly fail to
stop aggressive tax reduction strategies.5 This dis-
appointing state of affairs hardly reflects a lack of
attention from Congress, the Treasury Department,
and the Internal Revenue Service. While more leg-
islation and administrative guidance could have
been issued to deal with individual abuses discov-
ered from time to time, it would hardly stem the
tide of derivatives-based tax planning that has risen
at least two decades ago and shows no sign of
abating. We need a fundamental rethinking of the
taxation of financial products. And in order for that
rethinking to be well-informed, we need to know
much more about the problem at hand.
There is no doubt that the existing patchwork of
rules for the taxation of derivatives is full of holes.
Most knowledgeable observers would agree that
derivatives-based tax reduction strategies lead to
serious revenue losses and endless wasteful efforts
by sophisticated taxpayers and their advisors to
stay one step ahead of the regulators. Beyond this
general statement, however, little can be said with
any confidence. This is because while any study of
taxpayer responses to tax rules and their changes is
difficult, the difficulty increases by orders of mag-
nitude when the focus turns to derivatives.
Financial products are constantly evolving, often
highly complex, largely hidden from the public and
the regulators, and exceedingly lucrative for their
designers and promoters. Each of these consid-
erations would impede a rigorous study of
derivatives-based tax planning. Taken together,
these considerations make any such study ex-
tremely difficult.
This difficulty is compounded further by the IRS
reluctance to share detailed tax return data with
researchers. This reluctance is not limited to the
study of financial products, but it is particularly
problematic in this context. Leading public finance
economists are pleading with the IRS for more —
and more detailed — data.6 They are capable,
skilled, and motivated. They can help us gain
crucial knowledge at no cost to the public fisc. It is
beyond doubt that tax return data may be made
available while preserving utmost taxpayer privacy
and following the letter and the spirit of the tax-
payer protection laws. A nudge or two from each of
the tax writing Committees to induce the IRS to
share detailed return data with researchers is likely
to make an enormous difference in our understand-
ing of derivatives-based tax planning. While the
time to consider a fundamental reform of deriva-
tives taxation is certainly now, gaining a better
understanding of the existing problem and the
reform’s impact will remain essential for years to
come.
B. Evaluating Tax Systems — the Three
Benchmarks
In order to evaluate any given fundamental
change in the taxation of financial products one
needs to understand how to evaluate alternative
proposals. Legal tax academics and public finance
economists have been searching for decades for
comprehensive and principled ways of evaluating
possible regimes for taxing capital income in gen-
eral and income from financial products in particu-
lar. Three benchmarks have emerged as a result of
this search.
The first benchmark is symmetry. If both sides to
every transaction are taxed under the same timing
rule and rate, they face equal and opposite incen-
tives, which allows the system to police itself. In a
fully symmetric system the government collects no
net revenue from the taxation of derivatives. Impor-
tantly, the government does not lose any revenue
either. In other words, derivatives cannot be used to
shelter income from real investment and labor.
3See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax
Planning, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1312 (2001) (describing relative
ineffectiveness of the constructive sale regime of section 1259).
4The taxation of credit default swaps, for instance, has
remained highly uncertain for years. See Notice 2004-52, 2004-1
C.B. 973 (offering several possible ways to characterize credit
default swaps for U.S. federal income tax purposes and request-
ing comments). Proposed regulations aimed at resolving this
uncertainty have been issued just a few months ago and they
will not become effective for some time. See Prop. Treas. Reg.
1.446-3(c)(iii), 76 Fed. Reg. 57,684 (Sept. 16, 2011).
5The challenge of separating the former from the latter exists
today and will continue to exist in any alternative regime of
financial products taxation. Most fundamental reform proposals
(including those by two members of today’s panel) expressly
state that derivatives used in business hedging should be
subject to special tax rules different from those applying to all
other derivatives. See David S. Miller, A Progressive System of
Mark-to-Market Taxation, 109 Tax Notes 1047 (2005) (referring to
the need for a separate regime for business hedging while
suggesting that many derivatives and other property become
subject to a mark-to-market regime); David A. Weisbach, A
Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System, 53 Tax L. Rev. 95, 129 (1999)
(making a similar suggestion); Columbia Law School Professor
Suggests Derivatives Be Subject to Mark-to-Market Regime, 2008
TNT 45-55 (making a similar suggestion in my 2008 Congres-
sional testimony).
6See, e.g., David Card, Raj Chetty, Martin Feldstein & Em-
manuel Saez, Expanding Access to Administrative Data for Research
in the United States (a response to the National Science Founda-
tion call for white papers on ‘‘Future Research in the Social,
Behavioral & Economic Sciences’’).
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Unfortunately, symmetry is unattainable without
a dramatic overhaul of the Internal Revenue Code.
Tax-exempt entities and foreigners often pay no
U.S. income tax. Securities dealers may be thought
of as tax-exempt as well because their derivative
trades with clients are hedged, and mark-to-market
accounting assures that only dealers’ fees are tax-
able.7 The presence of these tax-indifferent counter-
parties means that the taxation of derivatives will
remain asymmetric as long as taxable taxpayers are
on the other side of trades.
Consistency is another recognized benchmark.
The tax treatment of derivatives is consistent if all
economically comparable transactions (or sets of
transactions) are taxed the same, regardless of the
labels attached by taxpayers. For instance, an equity
forward, an equity futures contract, and an equity
swap on the same stock all have identical tax
consequences in a consistent tax system, as does a
leveraged purchase of that stock. Because tax treat-
ment is independent of transactional form in a fully
consistent regime, it is impossible to game the
system by choosing one form or the other.
Yet complete consistency is impossible without
fundamental tax reform. The U.S. tax law has
always relied on familiar cubbyholes such as debt
and equity, ownership and non-ownership.8 Basic
derivatives-like options have a long-established tax
treatment. As new financial products emerged,
some were subjected to unique tax regimes while
others were taxed by analogy to the well-
established ‘‘precedents.’’ The result is a patchwork
of rules that imposes significant planning and com-
pliance costs. While some of these rules have been
quite effective in constraining tax planning, others
have done little to impede it. Overall, this patch-
work is anything but consistent. Adjusting, reform-
ing, or even repealing one or a few of these rules
will do little to diminish the overall inconsistency.
The problem is more fundamental than it may
first appear. As long as the tax system continues to
rely on cubbyholes, consistency is impossible. This
is because basic instruments such as a coupon bond,
a share of common stock, and put and call options
on that stock are inextricably linked — a relation-
ship established by the so-called put-call parity
theorem.9 A share of stock and the two options may
be used to produce an economic return equivalent
to the interest on a bond. A share of stock and a put
are equivalent to a bond and a call. Many other
combinations may be constructed. As long as debt,
stock and options continue to be taxed inconsis-
tently, the fundamental economic equivalence es-
tablished by the put-call parity theorem will assure
that similar cash flows with the same risk profile
will continue to receive dissimilar tax treatment —
the hallmark of an inconsistent regime.
The third and final benchmark for taxing deriva-
tives is balance, which is achieved if gains and
losses from derivatives are treated alike (taxed at
the same time and at the same rate). If this criterion
is met, the government loses no revenue due to tax
planning involving derivatives even if their tax
treatment is neither symmetrical nor consistent.
This is because a taxpayer who enters into a ‘‘pure’’
derivative (that is, a derivative that involves a risky
bet that has neither a time value element nor a
return to labor) cannot know whether he will win or
lose the bet. If he wins, he would prefer a lower tax
rate and a deferral of gains. If he loses, however, he
would prefer a higher tax rate (making a loss
deduction more valuable because it offsets highly-
taxed income) and an acceleration of losses. If this
taxpayer has to choose the form of derivative bet
before knowing whether he will win it or lose it, this
basic market uncertainty provides a powerful con-
straint on tax planning in a balanced system.
Only fundamental reform will move the U.S. tax
system to a balanced regime. The realization re-
quirement that is deeply embedded in our system
gives taxpayers a timing option — a choice of
triggering tax consequences after they have learned
whether a transaction produced a gain or a loss.
Capital loss limitations, the progressive marginal
rate structure, and the nonrefundability of losses
produce unequal tax rates on gains and losses (with
gains taxed at a higher rate).10 As long as these
features remain in place, no incremental revisions
will assure balance in the taxation of derivatives.11
7This is because any taxable gain from a client’s position is
offset by an equal loss on the hedge and vice versa (setting aside
the fee built into the price of the client’s position). The character
of this gain and loss is always ordinary. The mark-to-market
regime for securities and commodities dealers is set forth in
section 475.
8See Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Finan-
cial Innovation’s Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 Tex. L. Rev.
1319 (1991).
9See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and
Income Tax Policy, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 460, 465-470 (1993).
10The tax motivated use of financial products may reduce or
eliminate this disparity and even reverse the relationship be-
tween tax burdens on gains and losses altogether for particular
taxpayers.
11For a fuller discussion of symmetry, consistency, and
balance, see David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of Derivative
Securities: An Agenda for Reform, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1888,
1893-1901 (2004).
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C. Options for Fundamental Reform of Taxation
Of Financial Products
Policymakers, academics, and tax practitioners
have devoted considerable effort to devising pos-
sible reforms of taxation of capital income in gen-
eral and financial products in particular. Reforms
consistent with one or more of the recognized
benchmarks have attracted particular attention.
Perhaps surprisingly, the variety of reform pro-
posals may be distilled to just three alternative
approaches: anticipatory taxation, retroactive taxa-
tion, and mark-to-market (or accrual) taxation.12
Most of the specific regimes in each category need
not be limited to the taxation of derivatives. The
broader the scope of the reform proposal, however,
the more objections it would need to overcome.
1. Anticipatory taxation. Anticipatory taxation
gives rise to income and deductions based on one’s
anticipation of a return from an investment or a
financial bet. In a tax system based on anticipatory
taxation, tax liability arises before a contingency
underlying a financial instrument is resolved and
before any payments under this instrument are
made or even fixed. This approach could be used to
reach only the time value return (if any) embedded
in a derivative or a risky return as well. The
ultimate goal is to eliminate or reduce the benefit of
deferring income that is available in a realization-
based regime. Because time value returns are cur-
rently taxed at a higher rate than returns to risk,
another benefit of the anticipatory approach is
eliminating an opportunity to convert high-taxed
ordinary income into low-taxed capital gains.
Interest imputation regimes for prepaid deriva-
tives are examples of anticipatory taxation of the
time value of money. One such regime is already
used for taxation of contingent debt — a financial
instrument combining an ordinary bond with a
derivative such as an equity call option.13 A similar
methodology has been proposed for prepaid for-
wards as well as long-dated and deep-in-the-money
options.14 More generally, interest imputation can
be considered for all derivatives that provide for
upfront payments. The logic behind this approach
is that a party making a payment at the inception of
a contract expects to receive at least an interest-like
return on its investment, so the pricing of the
instrument must reflect this expectation. If so, the
tax system should do so as well, and it should do so
regardless of the actual cash flows (or absence of
any cash flows) during the term of the derivative.
Interest imputation regimes may use a variety of
rates for imputation purposes. One alternative
would be to impute income at a rate determined by
the government from time to time (such as the
so-called Applicable Federal Rate determined regu-
larly by the IRS). This rate may be the same for all
taxpayers and all financial instruments entered into
during any given relevant period (a day, a month,
etc.). Alternatively, this rate may be floating rather
than fixed, varying for each outstanding prepaid
derivative each time the government-announced
rate changes. Another option would be to use a rate
that is specific to each taxpayer. This is the approach
chosen in the contingent debt regulations that re-
quire imputation at the so-called comparable yield
— a rate that the issuer of a contingent bond would
pay on a debt instrument that is similar to that
contingent bond but does not have a derivative
attached to it.
An anticipatory approach for risky (rather than
time value) returns would require taxpayers to
determine the expected value of every contingency
(perhaps disaggregating a complex financial instru-
ment to produce several instruments each with a
single contingency) and to include in income the
difference between this expected value and the
derivative’s cost on a yield-to-maturity basis.15 If
the actual gain or loss turns out to be different from
the expected one, that difference would be taken
into account when the contingency is resolved.16
The weaknesses of all anticipatory approaches
are not hard to see. Imputing time value returns
raises questions about the appropriate rate of im-
putation. Imputing contingent returns is based on
12Other categorizations are possible. See, e.g., Warren, supra
note 9, at 474-475.
13See Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.1275-4.
14See NYSBA Suggests Changes to Timing and Character Rules
for Prepaid Forwards and Options, 2001 TNT 64-23. Representative
Richard Neal proposed legislation using a similar approach in
2008. See Yoram Keinan & Ray Beeman, The Tax Treatment of
Exchange-Traded Notes: Here We Go Again, 2008 TNT 88-32
(describing and discussing proposed legislation aimed at estab-
lishing an interest imputation regime for certain prepaid deriva-
tives).
15See Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of
Financial Instruments, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 243 (1992).
16For example:
I pays J $100 today; in exchange, J promises to pay I either
$166 or $100 in three years depending on the toss of a coin
at that time. The expected value of the contract in year 3
is $133, because there is a 50% probability of receiving
$100 and a 50% probability of receiving $166. [0.5x$100 +
0.5x166 = 133] That expected value implies an expected
gain of $33 and a yield-to-maturity of 10%, because
$100x(1.1)3 = $133, so the taxable income would be
allocated $10 to year 1, $11 to year 2, and $12 to year 3. . . .
I would include, and J would deduct, those amounts each
year. I’s basis would then be $133, and gain or loss on the
coin toss would be taken into account in year 3. Warren,
supra note 9, at 479, based on Shuldiner, supra, note 15.
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uncertain expectations about possible resolutions of
future contingencies. Both types of imputations
give rise to phantom income that is currently taxed
yet may never be received.17 No imputation regime
bases tax liability on actual gains and losses in-
curred by taxpayers as they accrue.
2. Retroactive taxation. Retroactive taxation avoids
most weaknesses of anticipatory taxation (with the
exception of one specific regime discussed at the
end of this section). The returns are taxed retroac-
tively — at the end of the transaction when gain or
loss is known with certainty and when the payment
is received by the taxpayer who ended up winning
the financial bet.18 The key feature of retroactive
taxation regimes is to spread this gain (or loss)
backward and allocate it over the term of the
derivative. Once this allocation is accomplished,
gain deemed realized in earlier years gives rise to
tax liability that accrues interest over the deriva-
tive’s term.19 As a result of this retroactive allocation
combined with interest accrual, the benefit of defer-
ring taxable gain until maturity is reduced.
Proposals differ on how to spread the gain over
the term of the instrument, and even how to calcu-
late the gain in the first place. An early proposal
based a retroactively-imposed tax liability on the
actual pattern of gain accrual.20 An approach
adopted in the Internal Revenue Code for taxation
of the so-called constructive ownership transactions
presumes that the realized gain accrued at a con-
stant rate over the term of the derivative.21 A
simpler solution adopted in a different part of the
Code is a ratable allocation achieved by dividing
the realized gain by the number of days a financial
interest was held by a taxpayer and attributing the
resulting daily gains to taxable years that include
each given day.22 The first of these allocation ap-
proaches requires annual valuation of positions.
The other two introduce obvious deviations from
actual changes in value, producing unintended
winners and losers.23
Furthermore, all of these solutions expose the
government to the credit risk of taxpayers entering
into derivative contracts. Because pure derivatives
are zero-sum bets, one side’s win is always equal to
the other side’s loss. In a retroactive tax regime, the
losing side would rest assured that it would even-
tually collect overpaid taxes from the government,
with interest. The government, however, cannot be
similarly certain that the winning side would be
able to pay a very large tax, which may be much
larger than the tax resulting from the same gain in a
realization-based system. The reason for this differ-
ence is that in a retroactive regime the payment
would include not just the tax on gain, but also
interest on earlier deemed tax underpayments. That
interest would accrue over many years for a long-
term derivative, possibly producing a very large
total tax obligation.24
Another retroactive taxation approach deter-
mines tax liability on the basis of presumed, rather
than actual, gain.25 As with other retroactive pro-
posals, the tax would be imposed when the deriva-
tive is settled, and the amount realized would be
equal to the payment actually made. The gain
would be calculated, as in a realization-based sys-
tem, by subtracting cost (or basis) from the amount
realized. However, that cost would be an imaginary
17Most imputation proposals (and the actual contingent debt
regime) provide for adjustments when the contingency is re-
solved. Such delayed reconciliations are a small consolation for
taxpayers who overpay their taxes in earlier years, unless the
government compensates taxpayers for such overpayments
with interest. On the other hand, the government loses out if the
actual payment at maturity turns out to be larger than expected,
unless the taxpayer pays interest for the deferral of her tax
liability.
18Unlike cash settlement, a physical settlement of derivatives
does not lead to the receipt of a cash payment by the winning
counterparty. Yet liquidity concerns do not loom particularly
large in this case either because that counterparty (i) had
enough cash to purchase the underlying asset (unless the
contract was prepaid, in which case the party had the requisite
amount of cash at the contract’s inception) and (ii) acquired an
asset that could be sold (in whole or in part) or monetized in
other ways (for example, by being used as collateral for a loan).
19If the derivative ends up producing a deductible loss, then
(at least in balanced proposals) this loss is similarly allocated to
prior years, giving rise to deductions and interest payable to the
taxpayer for the overpayment of tax on account of not taking
these deductions in earlier years.
20See William Vickrey, Averaging of Income for Income Tax
Purposes, 47 J. Pol. Econ. 379, 382-396 (1939).
21See I.R.C. section 1260.
22See I.R.C. section 1291 describing taxation of the so-called
passive foreign investment companies.
23For instance, a taxpayer whose position in a ten year
forward appreciated substantially in the first year and then
remained unchanged would be better off under either the
second or the third regime than under a mark-to-market system
that would tax the large gain in the first year of the contract. A
taxpayer whose position in a ten year forward did not change in
value for nine years and appreciated a lot in the last year would
be worse off under either retroactive regime than he would be in
a mark-to-market system.
24If all returns from financial products are not taxed the same
(e.g., if capital gains and losses are subject to different tax
treatment than ordinary income and deductions), retroactive
taxation regimes are further complicated by the need to police
taxpayers’ efforts to elect the character of gain or loss immedi-
ately before the retroactive gain or loss calculation takes place.
For an example of how the current law attempts to prevent this
type of planning see I.R.C. section 1260(a), (e).
25See Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81
Am. Econ. Rev. 167 (1991); Alan J. Auerbach & David F.
Bradford, Generalized Cash-Flow Taxation, 88 J. Pub. Econ. 957
(2004). As the titles of these papers suggest, this approach is not
limited to derivatives.
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number determined by discounting the actual
amount realized at the risk-free rate over the term of
the derivative.26 The beauty of this approach is that,
under certain assumptions, it is equivalent to an
accrual-based (or mark-to-market) regime from an
ex ante perspective. Yet this retroactive method
avoids valuation and liquidity problems associated
with mark-to-market taxation, does not give tax-
payers an opportunity to defer gains and accelerate
losses, and does not lock taxpayers into their invest-
ments.27 From an ex post perspective, however, the
results under this method are very different from an
accrual-based tax as this regime clearly ignores
actual gains and losses. Moreover, the ex ante
equivalence obtains only if investors are fully ra-
tional and make optimal portfolio choices — as-
sumptions of questionable validity in the real
world.
3. Mark-to-market taxation. In a mark-to-market
system, all gains and losses are taxed as if each
position is terminated (or sold) at the end of each
taxable year and re-entered (re-acquired) at the
beginning of the next year. Thus, this system would
base tax liability on annual fluctuations in value,
whether or not any given asset is sold or retained by
a taxpayer.28 Losses from derivatives would be
deductible only against gains from derivatives. Ex-
cess losses would be either immediately refundable
or available to reduce gains from derivatives in
other tax years — either in the future or with a
limited carryback. Importantly, the rate applying to
gains and losses would be flat.29 If one believes that
most derivatives users are either high net worth
individuals or large corporations, one would set
that rate at the top marginal rate, individual or
corporate, as appropriate. A more precise approach
would set the rate at the top individual or corporate
rate applying to any given taxpayer in any particu-
lar tax year.30 As in many versions of the anticipa-
tory and retroactive tax regimes, business hedges
would be excluded from mark-to-market rules and
subject to a special treatment.
The main objections to mark-to-market taxation
are valuation and liquidity concerns. The former
highlights informational demands of obtaining
valuations of all derivatives as well as administra-
tion and enforcement concerns with verifying these
valuations. The latter reflects unease with forcing
taxpayers to pay tax on ‘‘paper gains’’ before they
receive any cash related to these gains.
4. Why Single Out Derivatives? In addition to
objections unique to each fundamental reform pro-
posal, any such proposal limited to financial instru-
ments encounters arguments about its scope. Why
single out derivatives? Without providing an ex-
haustive answer to this question, the following
observations suggest a partial response.
Any reform introducing a special regime for
derivatives raises a line drawing problem. If deriva-
tives are taxed differently from everything else,
taxpayers must know how to distinguish a deriva-
tive from a non-derivative. In my view, a broad
definition of a derivative is appropriate, although
one’s conclusion about the optimal breadth may be
affected by one’s choice of the new treatment for
derivatives. In any case, if all derivatives are treated
the same, it will be much easier (and cheaper) to
draw and maintain just one line — between deriva-
tives and non-derivatives — than it is to continually
delineate forwards from swaps from options from
futures from prepaid derivatives and so on, as the
existing tax rules attempt to do.31 That is, while a
line drawing exercise will still be needed, the num-
ber of lines will be dramatically reduced.
It may also turn out that the new regime will
result in a less favorable tax treatment of derivatives
compared to that of ‘‘plain vanilla’’ investments
such as stocks, bonds, and real estate. This, one
might argue, will be both unfair and inefficient. The
criticism is not particularly convincing. ‘‘Equal
treatment’’ is certainly not the hallmark of our tax
system today. For example, growth stocks are
26For example, ‘‘[c]onsider an asset that is sold for $100 when
the riskless rate of return is 10% and the tax rate is 30%. If the
asset had been held for one year, the tax would be $2.70, which
is 30% of an amount of gain determined by subtracting from the
amount realized ($100) a hypothetical cost ($91) based on the
assumption of a 10% return ($91 = $100/1.1). If the asset had
been held for two years, the tax would be 30% of $100 -
[$100/(1.1)2], or $5.21.’’ Warren, supra note 9, at 481.
27Because the gain is calculated by assuming that the entire
return from a derivative is based on a risk-free rate com-
pounded over the derivative’s term, only the riskless return is
taxed under this approach. If one believes that an ideal income
tax does not tax risky returns in any case, this result is not
particularly problematic. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, The (Non)
Taxation of Risk, 58 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2004).
28For discussions of a mark-to-market regime, see Daniel
Halperin, Saving the Income Tax: An Agenda for Research, 77 Tax
Notes 967 (1997); Miller, supra note 5; David J. Shakow, Taxation
Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1111 (1986); Warren, supra note 9, at 474; Weisbach, supra
note 5.
29Otherwise, gains will be subject to a higher rate than losses
because gains would push taxpayers into higher brackets while
losses would have the opposite effect. See Schizer, supra note 11,
at 1908-1909.
30In other words, the taxpayer’s rate determined without
regard to gains and losses from derivatives would automatically
apply to these gains and losses.
31This list does not mention the need to delineate various
transactions involving derivatives, such as straddles, construc-
tive sales, constructive ownership, several integration regimes
and the like.
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treated more favorably than dividend-paying
stocks. Bonds (especially discount bonds) have a
particularly disadvantageous tax treatment for
holders (accrual of income before its receipt) while
real estate and municipal bonds are especially tax-
favored. Some derivatives are currently taxed less
heavily than other economically similar financial
instruments. Rather than adding to the number of
tax-favorable and unfavorable regimes, a reform
following any of the approaches laid out above will
reduce this number by taxing all derivatives the
same.
The choice between the anticipatory approach,
the retroactive approach, and the mark-to-market
approach is not an obvious one. If one thinks, for
example, that derivative counterparties are rational
and sophisticated taxpayers who make optimal
portfolio decisions and are influenced only by ex-
pected returns, retroactive taxation based on pre-
sumed returns may have some appeal. If, on the
other hand, one views ex post outcomes as impor-
tant and believes that market values may be deter-
mined for most derivatives rather easily, mark-to-
market is an attractive solution.
Reasonable minds can certainly differ about the
merits and limitations of the various fundamental
reforms. The details of the three alternative ap-
proaches are important and will need to be consid-
ered with care. But it is essential to see the big
picture: The available choices are fairly limited,
reasonably well-understood, and may be adjusted
and even combined in a variety of ways. Whatever
obstacles preclude us from pursuing a fundamental
reform of financial products taxation, lack of knowl-
edge about how to move forward is not one of
them.
D. Interplay Between the Tax Reform of
Financial Products and Other Possible Reforms
A fundamental reform of derivatives taxation is
important, but it is hardly the only important
fundamental reform worth considering and being
considered. Other reforms, if undertaken, will affect
the need to resolve the problems with taxing finan-
cial products in a variety of ways. Some reforms
will make fixing the taxation of derivatives even
more urgent, some will make it less essential, and
some will have uncertain effects, as the following
discussion explains.
These Committees have already started to con-
sider the problems caused by the different tax
treatment of debt and equity.32 Any form of corpo-
rate integration that eliminates the debt-equity dis-
tinction will reduce the urgency of fixing the
taxation of financial products.33 This is because a
considerable volume of these products is designed
and deployed to give corporations interest deduc-
tions for issuing equity-flavored instruments.34 Tax-
deductible equity is the name of the game here, and
this game is not worth playing if debt and equity
are taxed the same. It is worth noting that financial
products exploiting the debt-equity distinction will
remain important if interest and dividend income is
taxed in a different manner (e.g., at a different rate,
as is the case today). Even if corporations become
indifferent between issuing debt and equity securi-
ties, the incentives to play tax games using deriva-
tives will remain as long as the tax treatment of
these securities varies for their holders. Thus, if
these Committees were to consider corporate inte-
gration leading to a uniform treatment of debt and
equity on the issuer side, the Committees should
certainly revisit the disparate taxation of dividend
and interest income.
Another significant reform being actively de-
bated in tax policy circles is a substantial reduction
in the corporate tax rate.35 Whatever is one’s view
about the overall merits of such a reduction, one
should be aware of its implications for the taxation
of derivatives. While these implications are uncer-
tain, it is likely that the flaws in the taxation of
derivatives will become even more costly if a sub-
stantial rate differential between individual and
corporate tax rates is introduced. The top individual
income tax rate and the corporate income tax rate
have been fairly close since the early 1980s — the
simpler days when financial products were not
nearly as prevalent as they are now. Therefore, we
can only guess how financial engineers would
respond to a strong incentive to create derivatives
that would shift deductions to high-tax individuals
while shifting income to low-tax corporations. But
our experience with derivatives-based tax planning
32See JCT Describes Taxation of Business Debt, 2011 TNT 134-14
(July 13, 2011).
33Because financial products are used not only to reduce
taxes by exploiting the debt-equity distinction, but to change the
character, source, and timing of income as well (as discussed
below), ‘‘reducing the urgency’’ certainly does not mean elimi-
nating the need to address taxation of financial products al-
together.
34The so-called mandatory exchangeable securities are the
prime (though by no means the only) example of these financial
products. For a detailed discussion, see Edward D. Kleinbard et
al., Everything I Know About New Financial Products I Learned
From DECS, Practising Law Institute, Tax Strategies for Corpo-
rate Acquisitions, Dispositions, Spin-offs, Joint Ventures, Fi-
nancing, Reorganizations & Restructurings 392 (2010).
35See Camp Proposes Switch to Territorial System, 133 Tax Notes
512 (2011) (describing the plan proposed by Chairman Dave
Camp that includes a reduction of corporate tax rate to 25
percent).
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certainly suggests at least two areas where such
income and deduction shifting is likely to arise:
executive compensation and owner-controlled tax-
able C-corporations.36 In each case, it will be fairly
easy for the corporation and the individual to agree
on the goal of minimizing their joint tax liability
and share the tax savings. There is every reason to
expect that derivatives will be used to accomplish
this goal.
Unlike a corporate tax rate reduction, an elimi-
nation of the special treatment of capital gains and
losses is certain to reduce the urgency of fixing
taxation of financial products.37 This conclusion
does not depend on whether such elimination is
accomplished by increasing the rate for capital
gains or reducing the rate for ordinary income. As
long as capital gains and ordinary income are taxed
the same, there is no point in using derivatives to
convert one type of income into another. There is no
doubt that a variety of financial products have been
designed and used to convert high-tax ordinary
income and short-term capital gains into low-tax
long-term capital gains.38 These products will either
disappear entirely or will lose some of their appeal
if all types of income are taxed the same.
Another reform that will even more dramatically
alleviate the need to rethink the taxation of deriva-
tives is a broad shift to mark-to-market taxation,
especially if that shift reflects the same approach
that is currently adopted in section 475. If all gains
and losses for a particular type of asset (perhaps
limited to publicly traded assets) are taxed annually
and at the same rate, there is no point in using
derivatives not only to change income’s character,
but to shift the timing of income recognition as well.
Deferral of gain is certainly one of the goals that
many financial products are designed to achieve.39
This goal will be beyond the reach of financial
engineers if broad categories of assets become sub-
ject to a mark-to-market regime.
A switch from world-wide to territorial taxation
is yet another fundamental reform under consider-
ation.40 Unfortunately (and, again, without express-
ing a view on the overall merits of this reform), a
switch to territorial taxation is unlikely to reduce
the need to reform the taxation of derivatives. In
fact, the opposite may well be true. There is no
doubt that financial products have been used to
change the source of income in order to avoid U.S.
withholding tax.41 It appears that derivatives are
being deployed to avoid establishing a U.S. trade or
business and earning income effectively connected
to that trade or business as well. Both strategies —
the re-sourcing of income and avoiding effectively
connected income — will remain important (and
even become more important in certain cases) in a
territorial system. Furthermore, shifting taxable in-
come offshore will have an even greater payoff
following a switch to a territorial regime because it
will lead to a permanent exemption from tax rather
than a mere deferral of the tax liability. No doubt,
greater financial benefits will lead to greater efforts
to design derivatives that would accomplish these
goals.
Finally, an argument in favor of replacing an
income tax with a consumption tax has repeatedly
appeared at the forefront of tax policy debates in the
past decades. The implications of such replacement
for the need to reform the taxation of financial
products depend on the specifics. Certain forms of
a consumption tax — such as an invoice-based
value added tax popular in most OECD countries
— are relatively resistant to the gaming and abuse
carried out through a deployment of derivatives.
Other versions — such as the so-called Flat Tax
endorsed by several Presidential candidates over
the years — are much more susceptible to abuse.42 If
a consumption tax is enacted to supplement (rather
than replace) an income tax,43 the need to address
the taxation of financial products will remain
largely unchanged.
36While such corporations are relatively rare today, many
more are likely to appear if the corporate rate drops substan-
tially below the top individual rate. For an example of small
business owners’ response to a tax reform that reversed the
relationship between corporate and top individual rate (with
the latter dropping below the former for the first time in
decades), see Joel Slemrod & John Bakija, Taxing Ourselves: A
Citizen’s Guide to the Debate Over Taxes 146 (3rd ed. 2004).
37The caveats stated earlier in footnote 33 apply here as well.
38These products include hedge fund derivatives partly
addressed by section 1260, conversion transactions partly ad-
dressed by section 1258, and exchange-traded notes that were
the focus of the legislation proposed by Representative Richard
Neal, see supra note 14.
39These products include variable prepaid forwards partly
addressed by section 1259, straddles addressed by section 1092,
hedge fund derivatives partly addressed by section 1260, and
exchange-traded notes that were the focus of the legislation
proposed by Representative Richard Neal, see supra note 14.
40See Camp Proposes Switch to Territorial System, 133 Tax Notes
512 (2011).
41See I.R.C. section 871(m); Notice 2010-46, 2010-24 I.R.B. 757;
Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Under-
standings, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 618-620 (2007).
42See David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 Stan. L.
Rev. 599, 624-30 (2000); Joseph Bankman & Michael L. Schler, Tax
Planning Under the Flat Tax 245, 255-58, in Taxing Capital Income
(Henry J. Aaron, Leonard E. Burman, C. Eugene Steuerle eds.
2007).
43See Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns
197-213 (2008).
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The overall implications of this discussion are
quite clear. Any reform that eliminates the distinc-
tion between different types of income, eliminates
taxpayers’ ability to elect one tax treatment or
another, or eliminates capital income from the tax
base would reduce the urgency of fixing the taxa-
tion of derivatives. Any reform that increases the
disparity in the taxation of different types of income
would have the opposite effect.
Yet whatever other reforms are considered today
or tomorrow, a serious effort to rethink and reform
taxation of financial products is critically important.
The incentives to invent new derivatives-based tax
reduction strategies are extremely strong. The hu-
man capital deployed in designing these strategies
is considerable. The problems with the taxation of
derivatives will not go away on their own. In fact,
these problems are certain to persist and worsen if
Congress fails to act.
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